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Abstract The Tuna-Dolphin disputes between the United States 
and Mexico have spanned almost three decades. They have shed 
light on the “PPM debate”, i.e. whether trade restrictions based 
on differences in process and production methods (PPMs) are 
justifiable under international trade rules. While a very strict 
approach against the use of PPM measures prevailed at the end 
of the GATT era, it has significantly evolved during the first two 
decades of the WTO. The Dispute Settlement Body eventually 
upheld a PPM “dolphin-safe” measure at the end of a particularly 
long judicial saga. The different Tuna-Dolphin reports show 
how environmental interests have gradually been integrated in 
WTO law and have influenced the interpretation of some of 
the core provisions of the GATT and the TBT Agreement (non-
discrimination obligations, general exceptions). These remarkable 
evolutions may be viewed as reflections of the objective of 
sustainable development mentioned in the WTO Agreement and 
as consequences of the judicialization of the multilateral trading 
system, which has allowed more legally sophisticated analyses 
based on the rule of law. They also illustrate efforts to foster 
the external legitimacy of the WTO, through greater sensitivity 
towards non-trade values. At the same time, the Tuna-Dolphin 
case law has become particularly complex, focusing on very fine 
technical details specific to the dispute, which has led to the risk 
of “never-ending story”. In this context, the search for legal 
security, coherence and efficient settlement of disputes may be 
the next challenge for WTO adjudicating bodies. At the same 
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time, the use of PPM measures remains delicate and requires the 
assessment and balance of a variety of interests, including the 
specific interests of developing countries.
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I. IntroductIon
The Tuna-Dolphin disputes between the United States and Mexico have 
spanned almost three decades since they first surfaced in 1991. These dis-
putes concerned US regulations restricting the imports of tuna caught using 
methods that resulted in the incidental killings of dolphins. They raised the 
issue of the justifiability under the world trading system of measures which 
apply different treatment to products based on differences in their process 
and production methods (PPMs). The “PPM debate”, and whether pro-
cess-based measures should be allowed under international trade law, was 
particularly intense when the Tuna-Dolphin dispute started. Between 1991 
and 2018, eight reports have been rendered, first by GATT Panels and later 
by the WTO adjudicating bodies. This “never-ending story” bears witness 
to certain major evolutions in the way the multilateral trading system has 
developed and how it interacts with non-trade issues, in particular environ-
mental protection.1
1 It should be noted that in parallel such discussion took place at the regional level, most 
importantly in what today is the European Union, see e.g. Andreas R. Ziegler, Trade 
and Environmental Law in the European Community (OUP 1996) and Rolf Weder and 
Andreas R. Ziegler, ‘Economic Integration and the Choice of National Environmental 
Policies’ (2002) 13 EJLE 239.
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In brief, the PPM controversy has crystallised tensions which may exist 
between different and potentially conflicting interests, such as, on the one 
hand, the reduction of barriers to trade – including for the products produced 
by developing countries – and, on the other hand, environmental protection 
(or other non-trade values). While prohibiting PPM measures could represent 
a major obstacle to international environmental protection efforts,2 allowing 
unrestrained process-based import restrictions could conversely lead to a sig-
nificant increase in barriers to international trade and could thereby interfere 
with the objectives of the world trading system. The use of PPM measures 
may also have an important impact on the interests of developing countries 
and their possibility to access the largest markets of the North. These coun-
tries have thus often opposed the use of unilateral PPM measures and have 
argued that such measures interfere with their sovereignty and priorities.3
The PPM debate has a myriad of different features, all of which cannot be 
analysed here. The authors focus instead on how the Tuna-Dolphin reports 
show in a concrete manner the evolution of WTO law on certain specific 
issues of the trade and environment debate.
After a description of the main steps that have marked the Tuna-Dolphin 
disputes (II.), this article comments the main aspects of the US – Tuna reports 
and their impact on the PPM debate at the end of the GATT era (III.) and 
under the WTO (IV.), before some comments and concluding remarks about 
the evolution of the PPM issue in WTO law and its impact on the debate on 
trade and environment (V.).
II. the Tuna-Dolphin saga In brIeF
A. The origin: the 1972 MMPA
In the Eastern Tropical Pacific Ocean (ETP), dolphins and tuna are known 
to school together: tuna often swim below herds of dolphins that are visible 
swimming at or near the surface.4 In the 1960s, the fishing industry has 
begun to exploit this association. The method of “setting on dolphins” con-
sists in using dolphins to locate schools of tuna and then encircle dolphins 
2 For further analysis, see eg David Sifonios, Environmental Process and Production 
Methods (PPMs) in WTO Law (Springer International Publishing 2018) 27.
3 Such opposition led eg to the complaint brought by India, Pakistan, Malaysia and Thailand 
against the United States in the US – Shrimp case. See United States v India and Others – 
Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and Shrimp Products, WT/DS58/R (US – Shrimp 
Case). See Sifonios, Environmental Process and Production Methods (n 2).
4 See GATT Panel Report, United States – Restrictions on Imports of Tuna, DS29/R, 16 
June 1994, unadopted, (US –Tuna II), para 2.2.
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intentionally with purse seine nets in order to catch tuna swimming beneath 
them. Many dolphins are usually caught in the process, with a high mortal-
ity rate. As populations of dolphins in the ETP decreased below sustainable 
levels, the US enacted in 1972 the Marine Mammal Protection Act (MMPA), 
in an effort to reduce the incidental capture of dolphins during tuna fishing 
operations. In the 1980s, the US amended the MMPA to include ban on fish 
or fish products imported from countries that did not have mammal protec-
tion programmes equivalent to the US programme.5
B. The two original US – Tuna GATT 1947 Panel reports (1990-
1994)
In 1990, the US decided to prohibit the imports of tuna from several coun-
tries, including Mexico, which continued to allow the method of catching 
tuna by setting on dolphins with purse seine nets in the ETP. The US also 
enacted dolphin-safe labelling requirements, under the Dolphin Protection 
Consumer Information Act (DPCIA), which excluded in principle from the 
dolphin-safe label tuna caught by setting on dolphins with purse seine nets. 
In the ETP, in order to be eligible for the dolphin-safe label, captains of large 
purse seine vessels and independent observers were required to certify that 
no dolphins had been set on deliberately with purse seine nets and that no 
dolphins had been killed or seriously injured when tuna was caught.6 In the-
ory, the same requirements applied in areas identified as presenting the same 
association between tuna and dolphins. However, no other areas than the 
ETP had been classified as exhibiting this association and their related injury 
and mortality risks to dolphins.7
Mexico challenged the US measure under the GATT 1947. The US – 
Tuna I GATT Panel basically concluded, on the basis of a legal analysis that 
has been much criticised, that this measure could not be justified under the 
GATT. It held that the US measure was a quantitative restriction inconsistent 
with Article XI (and not an internal measure subject to Article III) and that it 
could not be justified under the general exceptions of Article XX. This report 
applied what has been referred to as the “product-process distinction”, which 
basically implies that trade measures based on differences in the PPMs of the 
imported products are not justifiable under the GATT.8 This result caused 
5 For a detailed analysis of the evolution of the US dolphin-safe policy, see eg Trish Kelly, 
‘Tuna-Dolphin Revisited’ (2014) 48(3) JWT 501; Rodrigo Fagundes Cezar, ‘The Politics 
of “Dolphin-Safe” Tuna in the United States: Policy Change and Reversal, Lock-in and 
Adjustment to International Constraints (1984-2017)’ (2017) 17(4) WTR 635.
8 See eg Robert E. Hudec, ‘The Product-Process Distinction in GATT/WTO Jurisprudence’ 
in Marco Bronckers and Reinhard Quick (eds), New Directions in International Economic 
Law: Essays in Honour of John H. Jackson (KLI 2000); Robert Howse and Donald Regan, 
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strong negative reactions from environmental groups, which feared that this 
report, and the GATT more generally, could threaten the ability of states to 
take trade measures for environmental purposes and prevent governmental 
action to address global environmental issues.9
In 1992, the European Economic Community (now the EU) challenged 
another aspect of the US measure, the secondary embargo imposed by the 
United States on any intermediary country that exported tuna to the US. 
Such countries could not import tuna from Mexico if they wanted to export 
their tuna to the US market. Like the first Panel, the US – Tuna II GATT 
Panel considered that the US measure was not an internal measure covered by 
Article III, but that it constituted a quantitative restriction violating Article 
XI and that it was not justified under Article XX.
These two reports were never adopted. The GATT 1947 system required 
a positive consensus for the adoption of a report and the US never agreed to 
it.10 Despite having won the case, under the GATT 1947 system Mexico and 
the EEC were unable to enforce these reports.
C. The evolution of international dolphin protection rules at the 
end of the 1990s
In the meantime, international efforts to control dolphin mortality in the ETP 
were made in the context of the Inter-American Tropical Tuna Commission 
(IATTC). At the end of the 1990s, these efforts to adopt international 
rules to protect dolphins resulted in the conclusion of the Agreement on 
International Dolphin Conservation Program (AIDCP), which entered into 
force in 1999 and to which both Mexico and the US became parties. This 
agreement contained dolphin mortality limits and provided for monitoring 
and certification systems that included independent on-board observers. It 
also encouraged dolphin-safe improvements in purse seine nets, without, 
however, prohibiting their use. Under the AIDCP, the dolphin-safe label 
was available for tuna that was caught without killing or injuring dolphins, 
‘The Product/Process Distinction – An Illusory Basis for Disciplining “Unilateralism” 
in Trade Policy’ (2000) 11(2) EJIL 249. For further details, see Sifonios, Environmental 
Process and Production Methods (n 2) 101 ff.
9 See eg Daniel Esty, Greening the GATT: Trade, Environment and the Future (Institute 
for International Economics 1994) 35 ff; Andrew L. Strauss, ‘From GATTzilla to 
the Green Giant: Winning the Environmental Battle for the Soul of the World Trade 
Organization’(1998) 19 U Pa J Int’l Econ L 769, 771. See also infra, III.
10 See eg William J. Davey, ‘Dispute Settlement in GATT’ (1987) 11(1) Fordham Int’l LJ 
52, 85 ff; David Luff, Le droit de l’organisation mondiale du commerce: analyse critique 
(Bruylant/LGDJ, Bruxelles/Paris 2004) 772.
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regardless of the fishing method used. In other words, the method of setting 
on dolphins was not banned as such.
At the US domestic level, due also to the important success of the measures 
enacted to reduce dolphin mortality in the ETP, Congress enacted legislation 
which aimed at substituting the US import ban by the AIDCP dolphin-safe 
requirements, provided that studies confirmed that there were no significant 
adverse impacts on depleted dolphin stocks. The studies concluded that there 
was insufficient evidence of such adverse impact. As a result, the US dol-
phin-safe scheme was modified, so as to allow tuna to be caught using purse 
seine nets, provided that no dolphins were killed or seriously injured.11 This 
outcome was favourable to Mexico, which continued to use purse seine nets 
for catching tuna.
D. The Hogarth case (2007)
However, a new judicial episode ensued, this time essentially at the US 
domestic level. Different NGOs successfully contested the change in the US 
dolphin-safe scheme before the US Federal Appeals Court, in the Hogarth 
case.12 As a consequence, the original US dolphin-safe programme reverted 
to its original form:13 in the reinstated ETP, tuna was eligible for the dol-
phin-safe label only if captains and observers would certify that tuna had 
not been caught by setting on dolphins nor in sets in which dolphins had 
been killed or seriously injured.14 In other words, the method of setting on 
dolphins had been once again excluded, which was precisely the condition 
against which Mexico had been fighting since the beginning of the 1990s.
E. The US – Tuna II (Mexico) reports (2008-2012)
In 2008, Mexico therefore again challenged the US dolphin-safe scheme, this 
time before the WTO Dispute Settlement Body and under the rules of differ-
ent WTO agreements. The different challenged measures were the DPCIA 
itself, the Code of Federal Regulations (Sections 216.91 and 216.92) and the 
ruling by the US Federal Appeals Court in the Hogarth case.
The established Panel examined the contested measures under the TBT 
Agreement. It held that the measure at issue established mandatory label-
ling requirements and thus constituted “technical regulations” under the 
11 See eg Kelly (n 5) 504-506.
12 Earth Island Institute v Hogarth 494 F 3d 757 (US 9th Circuit 2007).
13 See eg Kelly (n 5) 506-508.
14 See eg Ibid 508.
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TBT Agreement.15 In short, the Panel concluded that the US measure did not 
afford less favourable treatment to Mexican tuna products (TBT Art. 2.1) 
but that they were more trade-restrictive than necessary to fulfil legitimate 
objectives (TBT Art. 2.2).16 At the same time, the Panel upheld the use by the 
US of its own standard, considering that Mexico had not demonstrated that 
the AIDCP dolphin-safe standard was an effective and appropriate means to 
fulfil the US objective at its chosen level of protection (TBT Art. 2.4).17
Mexico appealed the Panel report before the Appellate Body. In its 2012 
report, the Appellate Body reversed the Panel findings about Articles 2.1 and 
2.2 of the TBT Agreement, considering that the US measure granted “less 
favourable treatment” to Mexican tuna but not that the measure at issue was 
more trade restrictive than necessary to fulfil the US legitimate objectives.
One of the important aspects that led to the conclusion that the US meas-
ure resulted in “less favourable treatment” was the fact that the fishing 
method of setting on dolphins was prohibited everywhere in the world but 
was used almost only in the ETP (and was the method predominantly used 
by the Mexican fishing industry). Outside the ETP, purse seine nets vessels 
only had to provide a certification by the captain that no purse seine nets 
were intentionally deployed on or used to encircle dolphins during the fish-
ing trip. There was however no particular requirements concerning possible 
dolphins casualty caused by the use of other fishing methods, which means 
that tuna caught outside the ETP could be eligible for the dolphin-safe label 
even if dolphins had been caught or killed during the trip.18
Therefore, the DSB recommended that the US bring its measure into 
conformity with its obligations. Even though the US measure had not been 
entirely upheld and it had been considered to result in less favourable treat-
ment of Mexican tuna, the result of the Appellate Body Report was not 
necessarily in favour of Mexico. The main flaw of the US scheme was that it 
applied more stringent conditions inside the ETP than in other areas of the 
ocean. In other words, the US could comply with the DSB recommendations 
and rulings by enacting stricter conditions for tuna caught outside the ETP, 
without weakening the conditions applicable inside the ETP,19 against which 
15 See Panel Report, United States – Measures Concerning the Importation, Marketing and 
Sale of Tuna and Tuna Products, WT/DS381/R, adopted 13 June 2012 [US – Tuna II 
(Mexico)], para. 7.50 ff.
16 See US – Tuna II (Mexico), Panel Report (n 15), para. 7.374 and 7.620.
17 See US – Tuna II (Mexico), Panel Report (n 15), para.7. 624 ff.
18 See Appellate Body Report, United States – Measures Concerning the Importation, 
Marketing and Sale of Tuna and Tuna Products, WT/DS381/AB/R, adopted 13 June 2012 
(US – Tuna (Mexico) II), para 289.
19 See eg Kelly (n 5) 523.
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Mexico had been fighting. As such, and even though the US measure had not 
been upheld, the US – Tuna II (Mexico) reports already represented a major 
evolution in the PPM debate compared to the two initial US – Tuna GATT 
1947 Panel reports, as it will be further commented below.
F. The US – Tuna II (Mexico) 21.5 reports (2013-2015)
In order to comply with the DSB recommendations and rulings pursuant 
to Article 21.5 of the Dispute Settlement Understanding and to modify its 
dolphin-safe scheme, the US adopted the so-called “2013 Final Rule”.20 
It brought various changes to the Code of Federal Regulations, concern-
ing conditions relating to fishing methods, certification and record-keeping 
(tracking and verification).21 However, it did not change the requirements 
for access to the dolphin-safe label that applied specifically to tuna products 
derived from tuna harvested in the ETP by large purse seine vessels.22
The main changes consisted in strengthening the conditions applicable 
to tuna caught outside the ETP. The prohibition of harvesting tuna by set-
ting on dolphins, anywhere in the world, remained.23 However, vessels using 
other methods, both inside and outside the ETP, could be eligible for the 
dolphin-safe label, provided that no purse seine nets had been used, but also 
that no dolphins were killed or seriously injured during the sets in which the 
tuna were caught, which was a new requirement introduced by the amended 
measure.24 The verification that these conditions were met required certain 
certifications by the captain of a vessel and in some cases by an independent 
observer. Inside the ETP, large purse seine net vessels required certification 
provided by the captain of the vessel and an approved observer. By contrast, 
outside the ETP, such vessels required, in principle, certification by the cap-
tain of the vessel only (with some limited exceptions).25 The revised measure 
also applied segregation requirements between dolphin-safe tuna and other 
tuna to all fisheries, whereas in the original measure it was a condition appli-
cable only to large purse seine vessels fishing in the ETP.26
20 Document entitled “Enhanced Document Requirements to Support Use of the Dolphin 
Safe Label on Tuna Products”, see US – Tuna II (Mexico), Panel Report (n 15), para 1.10.
21 See US – Tuna II (Mexico), Panel Report (n 15), para 3.32 ff.
22 See Appellate Body Report United States – Measures Concerning the Importation, 
Marketing and Sale of Tuna and Tuna Products, Recourse to Article 21.5 of the DSU by 
Mexico, WT/DS381/AB/RW, adopted 3 December 2015 [US – Tuna II (Mexico) 21.5], 
para 6.16.
23 See US – Tuna II (Mexico), Panel Report (n 15), para 3.36.
24 See Panel Report, United States – Measures Concerning the Importation, Marketing and 
Sale of Tuna and Tuna Products, Recourse to Article 21.5 of the DSU by Mexico, WT/
DS381/RW, adopted 3 December 2015 [US – Tuna II (Mexico) 21.5], para 3.36, 3.40.
25 See US – Tuna II (Mexico) 21.5, Appellate Body Report (n 22), para 6.11.
26 See Ibid, para 6.33.
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Mexico again challenged the implementation measures of the “2013 Final 
Rule” under Article 21.5 of the DSU, claiming that the amended US measure 
continued to accord Mexican tuna products treatment less favourable than 
that accorded to like tuna products originating from other countries.
This time the Panel found that the eligibility criteria of the amended meas-
ure did not result in less favourable treatment to Mexican tuna than that 
accorded to like tuna products.27 However, it concluded that even though 
the revised certification requirements and the different revised tracking and 
verification requirements had been improved for tuna caught outside the 
ETP, they still resulted in less favourable treatment of Mexican tuna.28 In the 
subsequent appeal, the Appellate Body, in a very technical report, again did 
not uphold all the Panel findings and considered that it could not complete 
the analysis due to a lack of a proper assessment of the respective risks asso-
ciated with different methods of fishing tuna in different areas of the ocean. 
However, it concluded that the certification requirements had not been rein-
forced in the amended measure in all circumstances of risks that were com-
parably as high as those inside the ETP large purse seine fishery. Thus, the 
Appellate Body concluded that the amended US measure still resulted in less 
favourable treatment of Mexican tuna compared to like tuna products.29
G. The US – Tuna II (Mexico) 21.5 II Reports (2016-2018)
As a result of the first compliance proceedings, the US amended its measure 
again, which gave rise to a third series of dispute settlement reports at the 
WTO. The “2016 Tuna Measure” made no changes to the eligibility criteria, 
which meant inter alia that tuna harvested by setting on dolphins (anywhere 
in the world) was automatically ineligible for the dolphin-safe label.30 All 
other tuna products might be labelled dolphin-safe only if no dolphins were 
killed or seriously injured in the set in which tuna was caught.31 To verify 
that these conditions had been satisfied, the 2016 Tuna Measure introduced 
some additional certification requirements for all fisheries other than the 
ETP large purse seine fishery, in particular further instances in which an 
27 See US – Tuna II (Mexico) 21.5, Panel Report (n 24), para. 7.135.
28 See Ibid, para. 7.263.
29 See US – Tuna II (Mexico) 21.5, Appellate Body Report (n 22), para 7.266.
30 See Appellate Body Report, United States – Measures Concerning the Importation, 
Marketing and Sale of Tuna and Tuna Products, Recourse to Article 21.5 of the DSU by 
the United States, United States – Measures Concerning the Importation, Marketing and 
Sale of Tuna and Tuna Products, Recourse to Article 21.5 of the DSU by the Mexico, WT/
DS381/AB//RW/USA; WT/DS381/AB/RW2, 14 December 2018 [US – Tuna II (Mexico) 
21.5 II], para 5.11.
31 Ibid, para 5.11.
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independent observer was mandatory.32 Likewise, without changing the 
tracking and verification requirements applicable to the ETP large purse 
seine net fishery, the US introduced certain additional requirements under 
the regime applicable to all other fisheries.33
This time the Panel concluded that the 2016 Tuna Measure was “cal-
ibrated” to the risks to dolphins arising from the use of different fishing 
methods in different areas of the ocean. As a result, it accepted that the 
regulatory distinctions made (in particular between setting on dolphins and 
the other fishing methods) stemmed exclusively from a legitimate regulatory 
distinction. Hence, the Panel held that the 2016 Tuna Measure accorded to 
Mexican tuna products treatment no less favourable than that accorded to 
like tuna products and was therefore consistent with Article 2.1 of the TBT 
Agreement. At the same time, the Panel also concluded that the 2016 Tuna 
Measure was inconsistent with Articles I:1 and III:4 of the GATT but that it 
was justified under Article XX. The Appellate Body upheld the Panel’s con-
clusions in December 2018, finally bringing this dispute to an end.
III. the gatt era: the exclusIon oF ppm measures
As we have already mentioned, the trade measures at issue in the US – Tuna 
cases constituted PPMs, i.e. measures which specify the way a particular 
product is or should be made, processed or harvested. Such PPM measures 
were very controversial at the beginning of the Tuna-Dolphin saga. Different 
arguments were invoked at that time to defend a general prohibition of PPM 
measures.
First, it has been maintained that PPM measures conflict with the sov-
ereignty of the exporting country.34 It has in particular been argued that 
environmental PPM measures are “extraterritorial”, because they interfere 
with the sovereignty of the producing country to regulate the activities of its 
nationals or the activities occurring in its own territory.35 It has also been 
32 Ibid, para 5.13 ff.
33 Ibid, para 5.22.
34 For more details, see eg Sifonios, Environmental Process and Production Methods(n 2) 9 
ff, 67 ff.
35 See Kyle Bagwell and others, ‘It’s a Question of Market Access’ (2002) 96(1) AJIL 56, 76; 
Henrik Horn and Petros C. Mavroidis, ‘The Permissible Reach of National Environmental 
Policies’ (2008) 42(6) JWT 1107, 1125; Bernard Jansen and Maurits Lugard, ‘Some 
Considerations on Trade Barriers Erected for Non-Economic Reasons and WTO 
Obligations’ (1999) 2(3) JIEL 530, 533; Thomas J. Schoenbaum, ‘International Trade 
and Protection of the Environment: The Continuing Search for Reconciliation’ (1997) 
91(2) AJIL 268, 279 ff. See also John Jackson, ‘World Trade Rules and Environmental 
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contended that PPM measures represent a form of interference in internal 
affairs, which allegedly violates the international law principle of non-inter-
vention.36 In the same vein, some observers have claimed that PPM measures 
can amount to a means of eco-imperialism, if trade restrictions are used to 
impose values on other countries.37
Second, there was a fear among trade circles that import restrictions based 
on the production methods of imported products could significantly increase 
barriers to trade and thereby “threaten” the multilateral trading system as 
such38 and its underlying trade liberalization objectives. In this view, allow-
ing the regulation of PPMs by the importing country would be like opening 
a “Pandora’s box” and would represent a “slippery slope”, by which trade 
rules would allow regulations that represent significant non-tariff barriers to 
trade39 and that may be a form of “green protectionism”,40 because protec-
tionist objectives could easily be disguised behind environmental pretexts.41
The initial US – Tuna GATT Panel reports illustrated the support for such 
arguments, and presented a straight-forward preference for trade interests 
over environmental protection. For instance, the US – Tuna I Panel held that 
if PPM-based restrictions were allowed, the GATT could “no longer serve as 
a multilateral framework for trade among contracting parties”42 and would 
“provide legal security only in respect of trade between a limited number of 
Policies: Congruence or Conflict?’ (1992) 49 Washington & Lee L Rev 1227, 1244; US – 
Tuna II, para 5.17. For a detailed analysis of the issue of extraterritoriality, see Sifonios, 
Environmental Process and Production Methods (n 2) ch 5.
36 See James Thuo Gathii, ‘Neoliberalism, Colonialism and International Governance: 
Decentering the International Law of Governmental Legitimacy’ (2000) 98(6) Mich L Rev 
1996, 2029 ff. See also the arguments of the complainants in the US – Shrimp case: Panel 
Report, United States – Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and Shrimp Products, WT/
DS58/R, adopted 15 May 1998, paras 3.6, 3.41, 3.104 and particularly 3.157.
37 See eg Jagdish Bhagwati, ‘Trade and the Environment: The False Conflict?’ in Durwood 
Zaelke and others (eds), Trade and the Environment: Law, Economics, and Policy (Island 
Press 1993) vol 1, 174; Jagdish Bhagwati, In Defense of Globalization (OUP 2004) 155. In 
this view, such measures could be seen as an indication that values of economically strong 
nations are morally superior to those of economically poor ones.
38 See US – Tuna I, Panel Report (n 7), para 5.28; US – Tuna II, Panel Report (n 4), para 
5.26; US – Shrimp, Panel Report (n 3), para 7.45; GATT Secretariat, ‘Trade and the 
Environment’, in International Trade 1990-1991, vol 1, Geneva (1992).
39 See Bhagwati, In Defense of Globalization (n 37) 154 ff; GATT Secretariat (n 38); Jackson, 
‘World Trade Rules and Environmental Policies: Congruence or Conflict?’ (n 35) 1241 ff.
40 See Aaron Cosbey, ‘The Trade, Investment and Environment Interface’, in Shahrukh Rafi 
Khan (ed), Trade and Environment: Difficult Choices at the Interface (Zed Books 2002) 
7, 13 f; Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann, International and European Trade and Environmental 
Law after the Uruguay Round (Kluwer Law International 1996) 50 et passim.
41 See Jackson, ‘World Trade Rules and Environmental Policies: Congruence or Conflict?’ (n 
35) 1235.
42 See US – Tuna I, Panel Report (n 7), para 5.26.
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contracting parties with identical regulations”,43 which was obviously a sig-
nificant overstatement.44 With little more legal argument, the justifiability of 
PPM measures under the GATT was thus excluded per se by the two initial 
US – Tuna reports.
As mentioned, these reports were never adopted by the GATT Contracting 
Parties. Unadopted reports have no legally binding status as such in the 
GATT or WTO system.45 Hence, the US – Tuna GATT Reports do not for-
mally have any legal significance46 (even though a panel can find “useful 
guidance” in the reasoning of a relevant unadopted panel report47). In prac-
tice however, despite this fact, the US – Tuna GATT Panel reports have had 
a significant influence in trade circles, in particular at the end of the 1990s 
and in the beginning of the 2000s. Many commentators have referred to the 
product-process distinction applied by the two GATT panels in the early 
years following these reports, sometimes even considering that it was “set-
tled case law”.48 Hence, it has been often assumed following these reports 
that PPM measures were prohibited under the GATT.49
However, the US – Tuna GATT Panel reports have also given rise to 
intense criticism.50 Their exclusion of PPM-based trade measures was viewed 
43 See US – Tuna I, Panel Report (n 7), para 5.27. 
44 Indeed, WTO Members have in practice contested relatively few PPM measures before the 
DSB, and, more importantly, prohibition of PPM measures is the most extreme form of 
regulation of such trade restrictions. The use of PPM measures can also be disciplined on 
the basis of different criteria, in particular those of art XX of the GATT. In fact, it is likely 
that the original Tuna-Dolphin GATT Panels, and the insider trade policy elite at that time, 
were favourable to the simplicity of the product-process distinction, which represented 
what John Jackson referred to as a “bright-line rule”; see John Jackson, ‘Comments on 
Shrimp/Turtle and the Product/Process Distinction’ (2000) 11 (2) EJIL 303. The current 
approach of the WTO case law on PPM measures is arguably more legally coherent but 
definitely less simple than the initial product-process distinction. 
45 See Appellate Body Report, Japan – Taxes on Alcoholic Beverages, WT/DS8/AB/R, WT/
DS10/AB/R, WT/DS11/AB/R, adopted 1 Nov. 1996 (Japan – Alcohol II), p 15.
46 See eg Joost Pauwelyn, ‘Recent Books on Trade an Environment: GATT Phantoms Still 
Haunt the WTO’ (2004) 15 (3) EJIL 575, 585.
47 See Japan – Alcohol II, Appellate Body Report (n 45), p 16.
48 See Schoenbaum (n 35) 288, 290; Atsuko Okubo, ‘Environmental Labelling Programs and 
the GATT/WTO Regime’ (1999) 11 Georgetown Int’l L Rev 599, 618 ff; Hudec, ‘The 
Product-Process Distinction in GATT/WTO Jurisprudence’ (n 8) 189; Steve Charnovitz, 
‘The Law of Environmental ‘PPMs’ in the WTO: Debunking the Myth of Illegality’ (2002) 
27(1) Yale J Int’l L 59, 76 ff; Gabrielle Marceau, ‘WTO Dispute Settlement and Human 
Rights’ (2002) 13 (4) EJIL 753, 807; Joshi, Manoj, ‘Are Eco-Labels Consistent with World 
Trade Organisation Agreements?’(2004) 38 (1) JWT 69, 79; Pauwelyn (n 46) 585.
49 See eg GATT Secretariat (n 38). See also Hudec, ‘The Product-Process Distinction in 
GATT/WTO Jurisprudence’ (n 8) 189; Charnovitz (n 48) 76 ff; Schoenbaum (n 35) 288 
and 290; Okubo (n 48) 618 ff; Marceau (n 48) 807; Joshi (n 48) 79; Pauwelyn (n 46) 585.
50 See John Jackson, The World Trading System (The MIT Press 1997) 238; Hudec, ‘The 
Product-Process Distinction in GATT/WTO Jurisprudence’ (n 8) 187 ff; Charnovitz (n 48) 
60; Howse and Regan (n 8) 249; Erich Vranes, Trade and the Environment: Fundamental 
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as an overly literal and context-independent interpretation and therefore as 
lacking justification under the generally accepted rules of interpretation.51 
Their result also led to broad criticism from environmental groups, since they 
were perceived as resulting in unwarranted legal constraints on trade meas-
ures designed to discourage environmentally harmful activities occurring in 
other countries.52 In particular, it was feared that the prohibition of the use 
of trade measures to achieve environmental objectives could in fact reinforce 
the risks of international inaction and free-riding. Game theory may shed 
some light on this issue through the so-called “Prisoner’s Dilemma”, which 
is typical of international environmental cooperation problems53 and which 
may lead to the “Tragedy of the Commons” if no trade sanctions may be 
taken to induce cooperation, at least when internationally shared resources 
or global public goods are concerned.54
Hence, in brief, the US – Tuna GATT 1947 Panel reports gave rise to very 
strong arguments both from proponents and opponents of PPM measures 
and highlighted a situation in which trade and environmental interests were 
very clearly and strongly opposed. From a legal standpoint, the two GATT 
Panel reports also clearly favoured trade interests by excluding the justifiabil-
ity of PPM measures, to avoid “threatening” the multilateral trading system, 
but without a very detailed and solid legal interpretation. This result was 
probably damaging both for trade and environmental interests: the ability of 
importing countries to use trade measures to promote environmental protec-
tion goals was denied but these reports have also generated significant hostil-
ity and attacks from parts of civil society against the world trading system as 
a whole, which was seen as an obstacle to the promotion of certain non-trade 
interests, such as environmental protection. In any case, this situation gave 
rise to intense legal debates in academic writings, which continued at the 
beginning of the WTO era.55
Issues in International Law, WTO Law and Legal Theory (OUP 2009) 322; Barbara 
Cooreman, Global Environmental Protection Through Trade: A Systematic Approach to 
Extraterritoriality (Edward Elgar 2017) 322. See also Mitsuo Matsushita and others, The 
World Trade Organization : Law, Practice, and Policy (3rd edn, OUP 2015) 722 ff.
51 See Hudec, ‘The Product-Process Distinction in GATT/WTO Jurisprudence’ (n 8) 187 ff; 
Howse and Regan (n 8) 249 ff; Michael J. Trebilcock and Shiva K. Giri, The National 
Treatment Principle in International Trade Law, (2004) American Law and Economics 
Association Annual Meeting, Working Paper no 8 (http://law.bepress.com/cgi/viewcon-
tent.cgi?article=1007&context=alea), p 55; Vranes (n 50) 322; Cooreman (n 50) 29, 52.
52 See Jackson, The World Trading System (n 50); Hudec, ‘The Product-Process Distinction 
in GATT/WTO Jurisprudence’ (n 8) 188; Charnovitz (n 48) 60.
53 See eg Sifonios, Environmental Process and Production Methods (n 2) 30 ff.
54 See Ibid 32 ff.
55 See Andreas R. Ziegler, ‘The Environmental Provisions of the World Trade Organization 
(WTO)’ in International Economic Law with a Human Face (KLI 1998); Howse and 
Regan (n 8); Hudec, ‘The Product-Process Distinction in GATT/WTO Jurisprudence’ (n 
8); Charnovitz (n 48); Bhagwati, In Defense of Globalization (n 37); Laura Nielsen, The 
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Iv. the wto era: the evolutIon oF the ppm debate
A. Towards the integration of environmental interests in WTO 
case law
The Tuna-Dolphin dispute started under the GATT era but continued 
after the creation of the WTO in 1996, since the US dolphin-safe measure 
remained in force and the Mexican tuna industry continued to use the har-
vesting methods excluded by the US scheme. With the creation of the WTO, 
the dispute settlement system fundamentally changed, with the establish-
ment of a quasi-judicial body, the possibility to appeal panel reports, the 
automatic adoption of reports in the absence of negative consensus, etc. As 
a result, like the different US – Tuna reports show, the legal reasoning has 
become much more complex, allowing also a more balanced approach to the 
necessary trade-offs between trade and the environment.56 This evolution is 
visible in different aspects of the US – Tuna II (Mexico) reports adopted by 
the DSB through the years, which eventually upheld a PPM measure, at the 
end of a long judicial and diplomatic saga. The next sections present some of 
the most important features of this evolution of the PPM debate.
B. The applicable disciplines
With respect to the GATT, a first notable evolution is the question of whether 
the prohibition of certain imported products based on their PPMs must be 
qualified as an internal sale prohibition subject to the National Treatment 
obligation (Article III) or whether it amounts to an import prohibition 
(Article XI), which contains more stringent conditions. The two initial US 
– Tuna reports considered that since PPMs could not influence tuna “as a 
product”, they had to be qualified as an import prohibition subject to Article 
XI.57 This very literal textual interpretation, which did not take into account 
the object and purpose of the National Treatment clause, was much criti-
cised in academic writings.58 It has not been endorsed by the Appellate Body, 
WTO, Animals and PPMs (Martinus Nijhoff Publishers 2007); Daniel Regan, ‘How to 
Think about PPMs’ in Thomas Cottier and others (eds), International Trade Regulation 
and the Mitigation of Climate Change: World Trade Forum (Cambridge University Press 
2009) 97 ff.
56 See also Weihuan Zhou and Henry Gao, ‘“Overreaching” or “Overreacting”? Reflections 
on the Judicial Function and Approaches of WTO Appellate Body’ (2019) University of 
New South Wales Faculty of Law Research Series 49.
57 See US – Tuna I, Panel Report (n 7), para 5.15; US – Tuna II, Panel Report (n 4), para 5.9.
58 See Hudec, ‘The Product-Process Distinction in GATT/WTO Jurisprudence’ (n 8) 187 ff; 
Howse and Regan (n 8) 249 ff; Vranes (n 50) 322; Cooreman (n 50) 29, 52; Meredith 
Crowley and Robert Howse, ‘Tuna – Dolphin II: a Legal and Economic Analysis of the 
Appellate Body Report’ (2014) 13(2) WTR 321, 325 ff. See also Sifonios, Environmental 
Process and Production Methods (n 2) 101 ff.
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which has developed an economic interpretation of the concept of “like pro-
duct”59 (which is central to the National Treatment obligation), which implies 
that PPM measures are covered by Article III insofar as they can affect the 
internal sale of products in the importing state’s market.60 Therefore, the 
contested measure in the US – Tuna II (Mexico) reports was analysed under 
GATT Article III and the parties did not contest that the measure at issue fell 
within the ambit of this provision.61
C. The non-discrimination provisions and the relevance of the 
regulatory purpose
The US – Tuna II (Mexico) reports have also contributed to clarify one of 
the main controversies concerning the PPM debate, i.e. the relevance of the 
regulatory purpose in the analysis of the different conditions of the non-dis-
crimination clauses (Articles I and III of the GATT). Some have argued 
that PPM measures could comply with the non-discrimination obligations 
if it could be established that two physically identical products have nota-
ble differences from the viewpoint of a legitimate non-protectionist policy62 
(such as whether a tuna product is dolphin-safe). The Appellate Body has 
not endorsed this view, even though the definition of “like products” has 
fluctuated much in case law.63 In the US – Tuna II (Mexico) case, the parties 
seemed to accept that the main stakes did not reside anymore in this notion 
and agreed that the products at issue were like.64
More recently, the attention in academic writings has tended to turn to 
the discriminatory treatment conditions of the non-discrimination clauses.65 
59 See Japan – Alcohol II, Appellate Body Report (n 45), 16; Appellate Body Report, European 
Communities – Measures Affecting Asbestos and Asbestos-Containing Products, 
WT/DS135/AB/R, adopted 5 April 2001 (EC – Asbestos), para 98. See also Sifonios, 
Environmental Process and Production Methods (n 2) 108 ff.
60 See Japan – Alcohol II, Appellate Body Report (n 45), 16. See also Sifonios, Environmental 
Process and Production Methods (n 2) 108 ff.
61 See US – Tuna II (Mexico), Appellate Body Report (n 18), para 7.471.
62 See Robert E. Hudec, ‘GATT/WTO Constraints on National Regulation: Requiem for an 
“Aim and Effects” Test’ (1998) 32 The International Lawyer 619 ff; Howse and Regan 
(n 8) 266; Henrik Horn and Joseph H. H. Weiler, ‘EC – Asbestos’, in Henrik Horn and 
Petros Mavroidis (eds), The WTO Case Law of 2001: The American Law Institute 
Reporters’ Studies (Cambridge University Press 2003), 14, 25 ff; Frieder Roessler, ‘Beyond 
the Ostensible, A Tribute to Professor Robert Hudec’s Insights on the Determination of the 
Likeness of Products Under the National Treatment Provisions of the General Agreement 
on Tariffs and Trade’ (2003) 37(4) JWT (2003) 771 ff. See also Sifonios, Environmental 
Process and Production Methods (n 2) 117 ff.
63 For a detailed analysis of these evolutions of the concept of like products in case law, see eg 
Sifonios, Environmental Process and Production Methods (n 2) 98 ff.
64 See US – Tuna II (Mexico), Appellate Body Report (n 18), para 7.471.
65 See Henrik Horn and Petros C. Mavroidis, ‘Still Hazy after all these Years: The 
Interpretation of National Treatment in the GATT/WTO Case-Law on Tax Discrimination’ 
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It has been argued that the regulatory purpose of the measure could be rel-
evant in the analysis of whether a measure is discriminatory. In this con-
text, the debate was whether, for a measure to be deemed as necessary, it 
was sufficient that it resulted in discriminatory effects against imported like 
products or if a further analysis was then necessary. This second step would 
be whether these discriminatory effects could be explained by a legitimate 
regulatory objective; if not, it would mean that the measure at issue actually 
also has a discriminatory purpose.66 Different views have been expressed on 
this subject in academic writings67 and several cases brought to the DSB have 
dealt with this issue,68 including the US – Tuna case.
Even though these clarifications have been gradually provided by different 
reports, the US – Tuna reports have contributed to clarify some important 
points, in particular when it comes to the difference in the interpretation 
of the discriminatory conditions of the TBT Agreement and the GATT and 
in the overall relation between these two agreements. First, in the context 
of both agreements, the analysis starts with an examination of whether the 
measure has a detrimental impact on competitive opportunities for imported 
products compared to like domestic products (or like products from other 
countries), i.e. whether it has a discriminatory effect.69 The existence of such 
a detrimental impact on imported products is sufficient for a violation of 
(2004) 15 (1) EJIL 39, 60 ff; Petros C. Mavroidis, Trade in Goods: The GATT and the 
Other Agreements Regulating Trade in Goods (OUP 2008) 227 ff, 242 ff; Pauwelyn (n 46) 
358 ff; Regan (n 55) 122; Nicolas F. Diebold, Non-Discrimination in International Trade 
in Services: “Likeness” in WTO/GATS (Cambridge University Press 2010) 82; Lothar 
Ehring, ‘National Treatment under the GATT 1994: Jurisprudential Developments on 
De Facto Discrimination’ in Anselm Kamperman Sanders (ed), The Principle of National 
Treatment in International Economic Law (Edward Elgar 2014) 48 ff; Crowley and 
Howse (n 58), p 332. See also Sifonios, Environmental Process and Production Methods 
(n 2) 137 ff.
66 See eg Sifonios, Environmental Process and Production Methods (n 2) 137 ff.
67 See Horn and Mavroidis (n 65), 60 ff; Federico Ortino, ‘WTO Jurisprudence on De Jure 
and De Facto Discrimination’, in Federico Ortino and Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann (eds), The 
WTO Dispute Settlement System, 1995-2003 (KLI 2004), 217, 182 f; Mavroidis (n 65) 
227 ff, 242 ff; Pauwelyn (n 46) 358 ff; Regan (n 55) 122; Vranes (n 50) 247 ff; Diebold (n 
65) 82; Ehring (n 65) 48 ff.
68 Such as Chile – Alcohol, Dominican Republic – Cigarettes, EC – Biotech, US – Clove 
Cigarettes or EC – Seal Products.
69 See US – Tuna II (Mexico) 21.5, Panel Report (n 24), paras 7.432 and 7.481 (referring to 
the Appellate Body Report in EC – Seal Products: European Communities – Measures 
Prohibiting the Importation and Marketing of Seal Products, WT/DS400/R, WT/
DS401/R, adopted 18 June 2014, paras 5.93 and 5.105); US – Tuna II (Mexico) 21.5, 
Appellate Body Report (n 18), para 7.277; Panels Reports, United States – Measures 
Concerning the Importation, Marketing and Sale of Tuna and Tuna Products, Recourse 
to Article 21.5 of the DSU by the United States, United States – Measures Concerning the 
Importation, Marketing and Sale of Tuna and Tuna Products, Recourse to Article 21.5 of 
the DSU by the Mexico, WT/DS381/RW/USA; WT/DS381/RW2, 26 October 2017 [US – 
Tuna II (Mexico) 21.5 II], para 7.720.
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the GATT non-discrimination obligations, in particular Articles I and III. 
By contrast, TBT Agreement Article 2.1 requires a further analysis, namely 
whether the detrimental impact of a measure on competitive opportunities 
for like imported products stems exclusively from a legitimate regulatory dis-
tinction (i.e. whether the measure has no discriminatory purpose).70 Under 
the GATT, such analysis of the regulatory purpose is not relevant in the 
analysis of the discriminatory conditions of Articles I and III and is thus only 
examined in the general exceptions provision of Article XX (an equivalent to 
which is absent from the TBT Agreement).
With these findings, the interpretation of the main conditions of the 
non-discrimination provisions of the GATT and the TBT Agreement and 
their interaction have been significantly clarified, after three decades of 
intense debates. These debates did not exclusively concern PPMs but were 
often discussed in the context of such measures. In any event, this evolu-
tion shows that even though a PPM measure is likely to violate the GATT 
non-discrimination provisions, the general exceptions may provide justifica-
tion for their application (which the original US – Tuna GATT Panel reports 
had still categorically rejected).
D. The non-discrimination analyses in US – Tuna II (Mexico)
When it comes to non-discrimination analyses in the US – Tuna II (Mexico) 
case, the reports extensively address the general issue of whether there might 
be prohibited discrimination by excluding the eligibility of the dolphin-safe 
label for particular fishing methods. These analyses focus on “even-hand-
edness” and whether the differences in treatment (between different fishing 
methods in different places of the ocean) are “calibrated” to the different 
risks stemming from each situation. This “calibration” represents the heart 
of the compliance proceedings, since in the two of them the Panels and the 
Appellate Body analysed in great length whether the changes brought by the 
US to their dolphin-safe labelling requirements were sufficient to address 
dolphin mortality arising from fishing methods other than by setting on dol-
phins outside the ETP.
Such analyses are typical of non-discrimination cases and tend to ascertain 
whether the different treatment, in all its different factual aspects, is justified 
by a legitimate regulatory purpose. But at no point the reports even mention 
that differences in fishing methods, i.e. in PPMs, could exclude justifiability 
70 See US – Tuna II (Mexico) 21.5, Panel Report (n 24), paras 7.432 and 7.481; US – Tuna II 
(Mexico) 21.5, Appellate Body Report (n 18), para 7.277; US – Tuna II (Mexico) 21.5 II, 
Panels Reports (n 69), para 7.720.
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under WTO law. The result is more coherent with the object and purpose of 
the WTO agreements, which can be viewed in this context as disciplining 
the use of protectionist measures disguised as non-protectionist regulatory 
goals,71 and not as an instrument imposing deregulation.72 In other words, 
its function is not to prevent WTO Members from using trade instruments 
for legitimate non-protectionist policy objectives.
In practice, the Appellate Body did not question the level of dolphin pro-
tection chosen by the United States, i.e. it showed deference to the regulating 
WTO Member in its choice of a legitimate non-protectionist policy. Hence, 
it noted that the US measure “fully” addressed the adverse effects on dol-
phins resulting from setting on dolphins in the ETP.73 Since the Appellate 
Body respected the US chosen level of protection, the results of the US – 
Tuna II (Mexico) reports have in fact been an increase in environmental 
protection, since the dolphin protection standards in the ETP have remained 
unchanged, while those outside the ETP have been strengthened (highest 
common denominator).
Yet, in order to avoid any disguised protectionism, the Appellate Body 
examined thoroughly the different elements of the measure. Some of them 
did not seem coherent with the dolphin-protection objective (lower dol-
phin-protection standard outside the ETP, despite the existence of certain 
risks) and were thus viewed as discriminatory. Even though the US eventu-
ally won, it had to amend its legislation twice for its measure to be upheld. 
But even in its final version, the contested measure still addressed the same 
externality (risks of harm caused to dolphins) in different ways, on the basis 
of differences in the magnitude of these externalities (respective importance 
of the risks of harming dolphins in different areas of the ocean). At the end, 
the WTO dispute settlement system has not been overly intrusive into the US 
environmental policy choices, while disciplining with significant precision 
the elements it deemed protectionist.74
In this respect, the final result of the Tuna-Dolphin WTO proceedings, 
compared to the GATT 1947 ones, shows a remarkable evolution in the inte-
gration of environmental interests in the interpretation of WTO law and in 
the debate on trade and the environment more generally.
71 See Zhou and Gao (n 56).
72 See Mavroidis (n 65) 228.
73 See US – Tuna II (Mexico), Appellate Body Report (n 18), para 297.
74 See also Zhou and Gao (n 56).
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E. GATT Article XX
Concerning Article XX of the GATT, different interesting elements can be 
pointed out in the US – Tuna II (Mexico) reports. These reports, like the 
majority of those which have applied Article XX, have given a crucial role 
to the chapeau of Article XX, which have become the most important con-
ditions of the GATT for the justification of environmental trade measures.75
Moreover, in this context, the US – Tuna II (Mexico) reports have con-
tributed to clarify concerns about the relation between the chapeau of Article 
XX of the GATT and the non-discrimination provision of Article 2.1 of the 
TBT Agreement. The Appellate Body held that in the context of the cha-
peau, one of the most important factors in the assessment of arbitrary or 
unjustifiable discrimination is the question of whether the discrimination 
can be reconciled with, or is rationally related to, the policy objective with 
respect to which the measure has been provisionally justified under one of 
the subparagraphs of Article XX.76 This analysis presents similarities with 
that which must be done in the context of Article 2.1 of the TBT Agreement. 
The Appellate Body accepted that so long as the similarities and differences 
between Article 2.1 of the TBT Agreement and Article XX of the GATT are 
taken into account, it might be permissible to rely on reasoning in the con-
text of one of the agreements for purposes of conducting an analysis under 
the other.77
In the context of the US – Tuna II (Mexico) reports, it meant that under 
both agreements, the issue was whether differences in treatment under the 
measure at issue were justified by reference to the objective of dolphin pro-
tection, because such differences reflected the differences in the risks arising 
in different fisheries and were “calibrated” to those different risks. In the 
view of the Appellate Body, the “calibration” analysis under TBT Agreement 
Article 2.1 encompassed consideration of the rational relationship between 
the regulatory distinction and its objective. In that respect, this analysis also 
demonstrated that the measure was not designed in a manner that constituted 
arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination within the meaning of Article XX.78 
As long as the measure had been properly “calibrated”, the measure was 
considered as consistent with TBT Agreement Article 2.1 and the conditions 
of the chapeau of Article XX (no arbitrary or unjustified discrimination).79 
75 See eg Sifonios, Environmental Process and Production Methods (n 2) 298 ff.
76 See US – Tuna II (Mexico) 21.5 II, Appellate Body Report (n 30), para 6.278; US – Tuna 
II (Mexico) 21.5, Appellate Body Report (n 22), para.7.316; EC – Seal Products, Appellate 
Body Report (n 69), para 5.306.
77 See US – Tuna II (Mexico) 21.5, Appellate Body Report (n 22), para 7.347.
78 See US – Tuna II (Mexico) 21.5 II, Appellate Body Report (n 30), para 6.279.
79 See US – Tuna II (Mexico) 21.5, Appellate Body Report (n 22), para 6.280.
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In other words, the “proper calibration tool” could serve in the context of 
both agreements.80 Thereby, the relation between the TBT Agreement and 
the GATT has been clarified. Even though these agreements have significant 
differences – in particular the fact that the TBT Agreement implies that all 
non-discrimination analyses are conducted under Article 2.1, whereas the 
GATT requires an analysis of both the non-discrimination provisions and 
the general exceptions provision – these analyses have similarities and con-
verge to a certain extent, which is of course important to achieve a coherent 
and consistent interpretation of both agreements.
A further interesting evolution concerns the “extraterritoriality” debate. 
One of the main reasons why the US – Tuna GATT Panels held that PPM 
measures could not be justified under Article XX of the GATT was their 
perceived “extraterritorial” nature and the supposed risks that this nature 
implied for the multilateral trading system.81 At the outset of the Tuna-
Dolphin disputes, it was frequently maintained that PPM measures inter-
fered with the exporting country’s sovereign right under international law 
to regulate activities occurring within its jurisdiction and that they had to 
be seen as extraterritorial.82 Certain countries also supported the view that 
PPM measures represented a form of interference in internal affairs, which 
violated the international law principle of non-intervention.83 Finally, many 
developing states have opposed the use of PPM measures because they were 
perceived as conflicting with these countries’ right to choose their environ-
mental and developmental policies according to their own priorities and 
their permanent sovereignty over natural resources.84
From a legal standpoint, and even though there has been notable legal 
debates on the issue,85 these arguments should be largely rejected as far as 
public international law is concerned, in particular because there is no right 
to trade and each country has the sovereign right to choose the conditions to 
which products can be imported in its territory.86 The ICJ has also rejected 
80 Ibid.
81 See US – Tuna I, Panel Report (n 7), para, 5.28; US – Tuna II, Panel Report (n 4), para 5.26. 
See also Sifonios, Environmental Process and Production Methods (n 2) 166 ff.
82 See Bagwell (n 35) 76; Horn and Mavroidis (n 65) 1125; Jansen and Lugard (n 35) 533, 
535; Schoenbaum (n 35) 279 ff. See also Jackson, ‘World Trade Rules and Environmental 
Policies: Congruence or Conflict?’ (n 35) 1244; US – Tuna II, Panel Report (n 4), para 5.17. 
See also, Sifonios, Environmental Process and Production Methods (n 2) ch 5.
83 See Gathii (n 36) 2029 ff. See also the arguments of the complainants in the US – Shrimp 
case, Panel Report (n 36), paras 3.6, 3.41, 3.104 and particularly 3.157.
84 See eg Sifonios, Environmental Process and Production Methods (n 2) 9 ff.
85 For a detailed analysis of the issue of extraterritoriality and trade measures, see eg Sifonios, 
Environmental Process and Production Methods (n 2) 67 ff.
86 See Ibid 79.
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that economic sanctions could amount to interference in the internal affairs 
of a foreign state.87
Nevertheless, the US – Tuna I GATT Panel applied a very strict approach 
concerning extraterritoriality, since it held that Article XX of the GATT con-
cerned only the use of trade measures to safeguard life or health of humans, 
animals or plants within the jurisdiction of the importing country.88 It made 
a similar reasoning with respect to Article XX(g) of the GATT.89 It further 
described the argument made by the United States as an “extrajurisdictional 
interpretation” of Article XX of the GATT,90 which could lead to a situation 
in which the GATT could “no longer constitute a multilateral framework for 
trade among all contracting parties but would provide legal security only in 
respect of trade between a limited number of contracting parties with iden-
tical internal regulations”.91 The US – Tuna II GATT Panel report resulted 
in similar findings.92 More generally, at the end of the GATT era, it was 
“notoriously almost impossible” to justify a restrictive trade measure under 
Article XX of the GATT.93
In the US – Tuna II (Mexico) reports, this issue of extraterritoriality has 
considerably evolved. As such, it has not been examined at all. In the view 
of the Appellate Body, it was sufficient that the measure aimed at ensuring 
that the US market was not used to encourage fishing fleets to harvest tuna 
in a manner that adversely affected dolphins.94 The US – Tuna II (Mexico) 
21.5 Panel applied a similar reasoning in the context of Article XX(g) of the 
GATT.95 Thus, while this measure would have been qualified as extraterrito-
rial under the reasoning of the US – Tuna I and II GATT Panels,96 the WTO 
Appellate Body seemed to consider the measure as “territorial” in the US – 
Tuna II (Mexico) report. In order to guarantee a “coherent and consistent” 
interpretation of the GATT and the TBT Agreement,97 it is likely that the 
Appellate Body would apply a similar interpretation for both agreements. It 
87 Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v. United 
States), Merits, Judgement, ICJ Reports (1986), para 205. See also Sifonios, Environmental 
Process and Production Methods (n 2) 80 ff.
88 See US –Tuna I, Panel Report (n 7), para 5.26.
89 Ibid, para 5.32.
90 Ibid, paras 5.28 and 5.32.
91 Ibid, para 5.28.
92 See US – Tuna II, Panel Report (n 4), para 5.17 ff.
93 See Robert Howse, ‘The World Trade Organization 20 years On: Global Governance by 
Judiciary’ (2016) 27(1) EJIL 9, 48.
94 See US – Tuna II (Mexico), Panel Report (n 15), paras 7.401 and 7.425; US – Tuna II 
(Mexico), Appellate Body Report (n 18), para. 337.
95 See US – Tuna II (Mexico) 21.5, Panel Report (n 24), para 7.522 ff. 
96 See eg Sifonios, Environmental Process and Production Methods (n 2) 166 ff.
97 See Appellate Body Report, United States – Measures Affecting the Production and Sale of 
Clove Cigarettes, WT/DS406/AB/R, adopted 24 April 2012 (US – Clove Cigarettes), para 
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is thus unlikely that the “extraterritoriality” issue will play a significant role 
in future cases in the context of Article XX of the GATT either, even though 
it seemed that it was the cornerstone of the US – Tuna I and II Panels’ rejec-
tion of PPM measures.
In any case, it seems that the rigid prohibition of “exterritorial” PPM 
measures has been replaced by a more flexible and balanced approach, which 
focused, in the US – Tuna II (Mexico) reports, on the “even-handedness” of 
the measure and on whether the different treatment granted to different fish-
ing methods were “calibrated” to the different risks to dolphins in different 
parts of the ocean.
v. comments and concludIng remarks
The Tuna-Dolphin saga has shown a considerable development in the debate 
on trade and the environment at the GATT/WTO, which has crystallised in 
particular in the evolution of the PPM issue. At the end of the GATT era, 
a very strict approach against PPM measures prevailed in the US – Tuna 
reports. This approach has evolved significantly during the first two decades 
of the WTO, in the context of which no prohibition of PPM measures has 
been endorsed. In the US – Tuna II (Mexico) case, a process-based measure 
has been eventually upheld both under the GATT and the TBT Agreement. 
The final result of the Tuna-Dolphin saga shows a very significant integra-
tion of environmental concerns into WTO law. Not only was the measure 
eventually upheld, but the US actually never had to lower the level of dol-
phin protection in the ETP it had chosen. The only modifications brought 
raised the level of protection outside the ETP, which therefore increased the 
overall dolphin protection level in all parts of the ocean (highest common 
denominator).
As such, this evolution is quite remarkable, in the light of the virulence 
of the controversies around PPM measures during the 1990s, where the 
respective positions were quite extreme, with on the one hand, the argument 
that allowing PPM measures could represent the “end” of the multilateral 
trading system,98 and on the other hand, the fear that the GATT repre-
sented an important threat to environmental protection, state sovereignty 
91 (stating that the GATT and the TBT “should be interpreted in a coherent and consistent 
manner”).
98 See US – Tuna I, Panel Report (n 7), para 5.28; US – Tuna II, Panel Report (n 4), para 5.26. 
See also US – Shrimp, Panel Report (n 36), para. 7.45 (the Appellate Body overturned the 
findings of the Panel in its US –Shrimp report).
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and the ability to address global environmental problems (“GATTzilla”99). 
The two initial US – Tuna GATT Panel reports reflected the view that pre-
vailed among the insider trade policy elite at the end of the GATT era, which 
strongly supported the product-process distinction and pushed towards fur-
ther neo-liberal globalization, through harmonization and deregulation.100 
In this view, PPMs could be seen as implying important risks of protectionist 
abuses that would impede developments towards the free trade ideal.101 By 
contrast, for environmentalists and part of the civil society, the prohibition 
of PPM measures, and thereby the inability to use trade measures to address 
global environmental problems or sanction free-riding, could eventually lead 
to potentially catastrophic environmental consequences (species extinction, 
loss of biodiversity, overexploitation of fish stocks, climate change, etc.).102
In the context of the WTO, and with the development of the Appellate 
Body’s case law, the search for this “free trade” ideal has evolved. The objec-
tive of sustainable development has been introduced into the Preamble of the 
Marrakesh Agreement establishing the WTO. As it has been developed else-
where, despite its vague nature, the concept of sustainable development may 
be seen as a common vision of the future of WTO Members, which attempts 
to reconcile the free trade ideal with the need to take environmental interests 
into account.103 For the Appellate Body, the concept of sustainable develop-
ment brings “colour, texture and shading” to the interpretation of the WTO 
agreements.104 This concept may thus have influenced the evolution of debate 
on trade and the environment at the WTO.
Besides, the judicialization of the multilateral trading system has probably 
also played an important role in achieving a better balance between trade 
and environmental interests.105 First, the WTO judicial system has devel-
oped more legally based analyses,106 and paid for instance more attention to 
the customary rules on treaty interpretation than the GATT Panels did. In 
99 See eg Esty (n 9) 35 ff; Strauss (n 9) 769 ff. 
100 See Howse (n 93) 21. See also Sifonios, Environmental Process and Production Methods 
(n 2) 12 ff; GATT Secretariat (n 38).
101 See Andreas R. Ziegler and David Sifonios, ‘The Assessment of Environmental Risks and 
Process and Production Methods (PPMs) in International Trade Law’ in Monika Ambrus, 
Rosemary Rayfuse and Wouter Werner (eds), Risk and the Regulation of Uncertainty in 
International Law (OUP 2017) 219, 223 ff, for a discussion about this vision of a “free 
trade” ideal future.
102 See Ziegler and Sifonios, ‘The Assessment of Environmental Risks and Process and 
Production Methods (PPMs) in International Trade Law’ (n 101) 224.
103 See Ibid 230.
104 See Appellate Body Report, United States – Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and 
Shrimp Products, WT/DS58/AB/R, adopted 6 November 1998 (US – Shrimp), para 153.
105 See eg Howse (n 93) 25 ff.
106 See Ibid 27. For a detailed analysis, see Sifonios, Environmental Process and Production 
Methods (n 2) chs 6, 7.
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the Tuna-Dolphin reports, this evolution is visible in particular in the PPM 
debate. For example, based on a purely textual interpretation of Article III 
of the GATT, the GATT Panels had considered that PPM measures were not 
covered by this provision.107 This restrictive view has obviously not been 
followed by the Appellate Body, in the light of the purpose of the National 
Treatment obligation (i.e. avoiding protectionism in the application of inter-
nal fiscal and regulatory measures).108 In the context of Article XX, the 
“extraterritorial” nature and the supposed risks it entailed for the multilat-
eral trading system was sufficient in the view of the GATT Panels to exclude 
any justifiability of PPM measures under Article XX of the GATT. By con-
trast, as mentioned above, the Appellate Body did not even mention the issue 
of extraterritoriality and applied instead a legally sophisticated non-discrim-
ination analysis focusing on the fine discriminatory elements of a measure 
which was otherwise not contested by the WTO adjudicating bodies.
There is no doubt that this approach, which is more based on the rule 
of law, has been possible because of the institutional developments that 
occurred at the time of the creation of the WTO. In particular, the possi-
bility to appeal panel reports has encouraged panels to better develop their 
legal argumentation, to avoid being overturned by the Appellate Body. The 
Appellate Body itself has been able to concentrate on legal matters, not 
unlike national appeal courts. Moreover, the right to challenge measures 
taken to comply with the DSB recommendations and rulings has given the 
possibility to verify what the implementation of those recommendations 
require in practice. Finally, the automatic adoption of reports in the absence 
of a negative consensus among WTO Members means that the losing party 
cannot block the adoption of a report, which may thus in turn influence 
future reports by WTO panels and the Appellate Body and bring a contribu-
tion to the development of WTO case law.
But this evolution can probably also be explained by the efforts to guar-
antee the external legitimacy of the WTO, i.e. the legitimacy towards the 
civil society.109 In the Tuna-Dolphin case, the Appellate Body has been 
much more deferential to the regulating Member than the GATT Panels. 
This greater sensitivity towards non-trade values is clearly visible in the 
Tuna-Dolphin case, in the light of the considerable differences in the general 
approaches applied respectively under the GATT era and under the WTO 
by the respective reports, despite a similar factual basis. In this context, it is 
interesting to remember that following the US – Tuna GATT Panel reports, 
107 See eg Crowley and Howse (n 58) 325.
108 See Sifonios, Environmental Process and Production Methods (n 2) 108.
109 See eg Ibid 148; Howse (n 93). 
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the multilateral trading system was the target of the anti-globalization move-
ments.110 Therefore, aggressive enforcement of neo-liberal globalization, in 
a similar way as that applied by the GATT Panels, would have been risky 
for the external legitimacy of the Appellate Body, much more than showing 
deference to non-trade values, such as environmental protection.111 In light 
of the inability of WTO Members to agree on further trade liberalization in 
their multilateral negotiations, any development in such direction that would 
have been brought by judicial action could have been seen as problematic for 
the principle of states sovereignty and the external legitimacy of case law (in 
particular in light of the automatic adoption of WTO adjudicating reports in 
the absence of negative consensus).
But at the same time, to avoid impeding the internal legitimacy of the 
WTO dispute settlement system, the Appellate Body had nonetheless to dis-
cipline the protectionist abuses of measures taken to achieve a legitimate 
objective.112 As a consequence, WTO adjudicating bodies have shifted their 
attention to the fine and technical details of the enacted provisions and to 
their discriminatory elements.113 In any case, through this more deferential 
approach, the WTO judicial institution has in a concrete way integrated non-
trade values into the interpretation and implementation of WTO law.
It should nonetheless be pointed out that a risk exists, with a strict appli-
cation of the Appellate Body’s approach seen in the US – Tuna II (Mexico) 
case, that case law could evolve towards a form of ad-hoc decision-mak-
ing,114 i.e. a focus on particular features that are specific to a particular fac-
tual situation, which could raise on the long term issues about legal security 
and coherence. Such form of ad-hoc decision-making also increases the risks 
of “never-ending story”, as the Tuna-Dolphin saga has shown, with the 
temptation of the complaining party to attempt reopening the case in the 
compliance proceedings, which could, in turn, reduce the legal security and 
the authority of Appellate Body reports. As mentioned above, the greater 
deference towards the regulating countries shown by WTO case law, and in 
particular in the US – Tuna II (Mexico) reports, has certainly contributed 
to the external legitimacy of the WTO. But in the long run, it is also impor-
tant to guarantee legal security and the efficient settlement of disputes and 
the US- Tuna II (Mexico) reports have left some room for improvement on 
this matter. This might be the next challenge of the DSB. The difficulty of 
110 See eg Howse (n 93) 10.
111 See Ibid 30.
112 See Ibid.
113 See Zhou and Gao (n 56); Howse (n 93) 53.
114 See Gary Coglianese and André Sapir, ‘Risk and Regulatory Calibration: WTO Compliance 
Review of the US Dolphin-Safe Tuna Labeling Regime’ (2017) 16(2) WTR 327.
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this objective is yet reinforced by the current near practical impossibility to 
change the wording of the WTO covered agreements, which contain many 
rather vague concepts open to interpretation in many of their most impor-
tant provisions, such as those relating to non-discrimination and the general 
exceptions. In this view, the task of the DSB is sometimes akin to squaring 
the circle.115
When it comes to the PPM issue as such, the initial debate about their 
exclusion under WTO law is now largely settled, as the evolution of the 
Tuna-Dolphin saga has shown. However, the use of such measures still raises 
certain sensitive issues. PPMs have some specific features requiring a bal-
anced approach between trade, environmental protection and development. 
As it has been developed elsewhere, different criteria can be used to differ-
entiate the deference that should be shown to the regulating Member wish-
ing to adopt a PPM measure and to help WTO adjudicating bodies in their 
aforementioned challenge to “square the circle”.116 Such criteria may be for 
example the proximity of interests between the importing country and the 
environmental situation concerned (transboundary externalities, protection 
of shared resources, global public goods, etc.).117 Another possible criterion 
is the intensity of the nexus between the products concerned and the envi-
ronmental risks at stake.118 PPM measures should also leave enough flexi-
bility to the exporting Member in the choice of the instruments adopted to 
achieve the environmental goal set by the importing Member.119 Moreover, 
since the most efficient environmental measures are those which allow an 
intervention at the source, WTO Members should negotiate with their trad-
ing partners to adopt multilateral environmental agreements.120 Finally, the 
regulating Member should possibly take into account the interests of devel-
oping countries, in which different conditions can occur or which may have 
specific needs in terms of special and differential treatment.121
The specific conditions and needs of developing countries may be relevant 
in particular in the examination of the chapeau of Article XX of the GATT, 
which refers inter alia to unjustifiable or arbitrary discrimination between 
countries where the same conditions prevail. In the view of the Appellate 
Body, this condition may require an importing country to inquire into the 
115 As it has been explained in more details in Sifonios, Environmental Process and Production 
Methods (n 2) 288 ff.
116 See eg Ibid 303 ff.
117 See eg Ibid 303.
118 See eg Ibid 303 ff.
119 See eg Ibid 305.
120 See eg Ibid 305.
121 See eg Ibid 241 ff, 306.
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appropriateness of its trade measure for the conditions prevailing in the 
exporting country.122 In this context, different elements might be potentially 
relevant in the analyses to be made, such as: (i) the nature of the environ-
mental issue at stake (e.g. transboundary pollution, shared resources, global 
public goods, etc.);123 (ii) the environmental conditions that prevail in the 
importing and exporting countries concerned (sink capacities, presence or 
absence of natural resources stocks, distribution of the respective costs and 
benefits of the environmental good at issue, etc.);124 (iii) the economic situ-
ation of the state concerned (financial and technological means, economic 
development, etc.); (iv) their respective responsibility for the environmen-
tal harm concerned (both presently and historically);125 or (v) the respective 
efforts made to protect the environmental resources at issue.
The analyses of these different criteria must be made on a case-by-case 
basis and any generalization concerning the general appropriate approach to 
be taken is rather risky. Nonetheless, these analyses could show, for instance, 
that the nature of the environmental threat at issue and the situation of the 
different countries concerned might, in certain circumstances, justify dif-
ferent levels of efforts between these different countries. In this context, the 
principle of common but differentiated responsibility could in certain cases 
provide some guidance, e.g. to adjust the required efforts to the level of devel-
opment or the technical and financial means of a country.126 Such approach 
seems particularly relevant in the context of possible trade measures taken 
to address climate change mitigation efforts; they would however be less 
adequate e.g. for measures aiming at the protection of shared endangered 
species.127 When the same level of efforts are required, other possibilities 
could be implemented to take into account the differing conditions occur-
ring between the different countries concerned, such as technical or financial 
assistance in the implementation of the PPM measure.128
The different criteria that have been mentioned here could provide some 
flexibility in the examination of PPM measures and the interpretation of 
WTO rules applicable to discipline their use. They could be helpful to find, 
for each PPM measure and in the context of the applicable provisions of the 
122 See US – Shrimp, Appellate Body Report (n 104), para 165.
123 For further details, see eg Sifonios, Environmental Process and Production Methods (n 2) 
23 ff.
124 For further details, see eg Ibid 24, 243 ff.
125 For further details, see eg Ibid 245 ff.
126 For further details, see eg Ibid 245.
127 Since in the former case (climate change) the overall result depends on the aggregate efforts 
of states (summation good), whereas in the latter the lack of protection in one country can 
threaten the overall result (weakest link). See eg Ibid 23 ff.
128 See eg Ibid 244.
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WTO agreements (in particular those related to non-discrimination), an ade-
quate balance between potentially competing interests that process-based 
measures often crystallize, and thereby, ideally, bring a contribution to the 
achievement of sustainable development.
